The Gas (Theft Control and Recovery) Ordinance, 2014

The Ordinance namely The Gas (Theft Control and Recovery) Ordinance, 2014 is no more enforceable after the consolidated judgment passed by Honourable Justice Shahid Karim.

JUDGMENT SHEET

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT LAHORE

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

          

Writ Petition No.11993 of  2014

M/s Rasheed C.N.G Station

Versus  

Federation of Pakistan etc

  

J U D G M E N T

Date of Hearing.  04.12.2014  

PETITIONERS BY:  Mr. Fahad Ikram Advocate, Mian M. Hussain Chotya Advocate, Mr. M. Salman Masood Advocate, Mr. Nadeem ud Din Malik Advocate, Mr. M. Ahsan Asghar Ch. Advocate, Ch. M. Shakeel, Mr. Arshad Mehmood, Mr. M. Riaz Ch. Advocate, Ch. Waseem Ahmad Gujjar, Advocate, Mr. M. Shahbaz Rana Advocate, Mr. Jahanzaib Khan Advocate.  Mr. Asad Ali Bajwa Advocate, Mr. Abdul Razzaq Advocate, Mr. Hussain Ibrahim M. Advocate, Mr. M. Mohsin Virk Advocate, Miss. Sumaira Khanum Advocate, Maj.(R) Aaftab Ahmad Advocate, Ms. Ruhi Saleha Advocate, Miss. Huma Khurram Sheikh Advocate, Mr. Asif Bashir Mirza Advocate, Mr. Sarfraz Ahamd Qureshi Advocate, Mian Mushtaq Ahmad-1 Advocate, Mr. M. Baleegh uz Zaman Chaudhry Advocate, Kh. Waseem Abbas Advocate, Mr. Imran Humayun Cheema Advocate, Rao Zaigham Ali Advocate, Mr. Aish Bahadur Rana Advocate, Mian Muhammad Rauf Advocate, Mr. Sajjad Ahmad-1, Malik Muhammad Imtiaz Mahal, Advocate, Mr. Muhammad Irfan ul Haq, Mr. Safdar Hayat Bhatti Advocate, Mr. Ashfaq Ahmad Tabassum Advocate, Mr. Irfan Mehmood Ranjha Advocate, Mr. Abdul Sattar Chaudhry Advocate, Mr. M. Mansoor Humayun Advocate, Mr. Shahid Hanif Advocate, Mian Mahmood Rashid, Advocate, Mr. M.Ajmal Khan-1 Advocate, Ch. Mehboob ul Hassan Advocate, Mr. Zafar Iqbal Chohan Advocate, Ch. Sarfraz Ali Dayal Advocate, Mr. Tariq Bashir Advocate, Syed Muhammad Shah Advocate, Mr.Ghulam Farid Sanotra Advocate, Mr. Saeed Ahmad Rana Advocate, Mr. Tahir Amin Chaudhry Advocate, Mr. Waheed Ashraf Bhatti Advocate, Major (R) Aftab Ahmad Khan Advocate, Mr. Khalid Hashmi Advocate, Mr. Muhammad Sharif Advocate, Mr. Umer Riaz Advocate, Mian Bilal Bashir Advocate, Raja Tasawer Iqbal Advocate, Ms Ammara Liaqat Bhatti Advocate, Mr. Muhammad Ashan Asghar Ch. Advocate, Mr. Muhammad Yasir Hussain, Mr. Muzaffar Aziz Khan Advocate, Mr. Zulfiqar A. Sheikh Advocate, Mr. Shahid Ismail Advocate,Ms. Sabiha Ali Chughtai Advocate, Mr. Munawar us Salam Advocate, Mr. Nadeem ud Din Malik Advocate, Barrister Ahmed Pervaiz. Ch. Akbar Ali Shad, Advocate.

RESPONDENTS BY:  M/s  Amir  Rehman  and Muhammad Mehmood  Khan, D.A.G for Pakistan. Mr. Umer Sharif, Advocate for the respondent-SNGPL. Mr. Aurangzeb Mirza, Advocate for respondent-FESCO. Mr.  Amanat  Ali  Advocate.  Mr.  Imran  Raza  Chadhar Advocate  for SNGPL  (Sheikhupura Range). Mr. Rasaal H. Syed Advocate.  Barrister Haroon Dugal Advocate for respondent  OGRA  and  Rana  Zia  ul  Islam  Manj, Advocate.

W.P No.11993 of 2014 2

Shahid Karim, J:- The connected petitions, a list  of  which  is  attached  with  this  judgment  as Annexure  ‘A’  are  being  decided  by  this  common judgment  as  similar  issues  of  law  have  been raised. 

RELEVANT FACTS

2.The  challenge  in  these petitions which has been brought forth, is encapsulated in the order of this Court  dated  5.5.2014,  passed  by my  learned brother  (Amin-ud-Din  Khan  J.)  which  is reproduced as under: - “Through  this  writ  petition  petitioner  has challenged the vires of Section 29 of the Gas (Theft Control  &  Recovery)  Ordinance,  2014.    Learned counsel  states  that  it  is  ultra  vires  to  the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973.  Further  states  that  his  suit  for  declaration, wherein  the  bill  imposed  by  the  respondent company has been challenged, was pending before the civil court.   The  interim  injunction granted by the  court was  confirmed  afterwards.    States  that petitioner  has  deposited  near  about  4.7  million under the orders of the court, whereas at the time of the suit, the disputed amount was near about 11 million.   States  that under  the new enactment  the orders  passed  by  the  court  have  been  vacated which  is  not  permissible  under  the  law.    Relies upon  “Dr.  Mobashir  Hassan  and  others versus  Federation  of  Pakistan  and  others (PLD  2010  Supreme  Court  265).    Further  argues that as the “court” mentioned under section 2(j) of the  Ordinance  established  under  section  3  of  the Ordinance does not  include  the High Court but  in section  4(2)  the  High  Court  has  also  been mentioned.   States  that as  the disputed amount  in this  case  is  more  than  5  million,  therefore, jurisdiction vests with which court is still not clear, therefore, states  that petitioner has been  forced to file this petition before this Court”.

3.  As  is  reflected  in  the  said  order,  the provisions  of  Gas  (Theft,  Control  and  Recovery) Ordinance,  2014  (the Ordinance,  2014), were challenged  as  being  ultra  vires  the  Constitution and  non  est.    It  is  not  relevant  to  revert  to  the W.PNo.11993 of 2014  3 facts  in  each petition.   However,  suffice  it  to  say that  all of  these petitions  arise  from proceedings which  are pending before  the Gas Utility Courts, set up under the Ordinance, 2014.  The grievances substantially arise from different orders passed by those  courts,  yet  they  have  now  converged  to challenge the very legality of the Ordinance, 2014.  The  question  therefore,  before  this  Court, which required  determination  was  whether  the Ordinance,  2014  is  ultra  vires  Constitution  of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 or not.

4.  During the course of the proceedings, it was brought  up  that  the  Ordinance  2014  stood repealed by afflux of time as it was lastly extended by  a  resolution  of  the  National  Assembly  on 14.5.2014  under  proviso  to  sub  paragraph  (ii)  of paragraph  (a)  of  clause  (2)  of  Article  89  of  the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 for  a  further  period  of  120  days.    It  stands repealed on the expiry of the said extended period on 23.9.2014.   The question arises as  to whether the Ordinance, 2014 was still a valid law or not as also  whether  it  stood  repealed  or  had  it  been enacted as an Act of the parliament.

5.  On 26.11.2014 the Deputy Attorney General for Pakistan was  required  to  seek  instructions  in the matter and to apprise this Court of the current W.P No.11993 of 2014 4 status  of  the Ordinance,  2014.    In  response,  the Deputy Attorney General, Mr. Amir Rehman has produced  a  copy  of  the  report  of  the  Standing Committee  of  the  Senate  on  Petroleum  and Natural  Resources  according  to  which deliberations  have  been  held  by  the  said Committee and it is recommended that the bill of the Ordinance, 2014 may be passed by the Senate.  However,  the  learned D.A.G submits  that  the bill is  pending  in  the  Senate  and  has  not  yet  been passed into an Act of the parliament.

6.  From  the  forgoing  discussion,  it  is  clear that  the Ordinance 2014 has, at  the expiry of 120 days  from  its promulgation,  repealed  in  terms of Article 89 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973.

7.  An  Ordinance  is,  by  its  very  nature,  a temporary  statute.    A  temporary  statute  as distinguished  from  a permanent  one,  remains  in force  for  a  limited  period  and  ceases  to  operate without  a  repeal.    The  power  to  make  and promulgate Ordinance  is a  legislative  and not  an executive  power.    Article  89  of  the  Constitution which  gives  the  law making power by Ordinance to the President reads: -“89.  Power  of  President  to  promulgateOrdinances.—(1)   The President may, except wen the [Senate or] National Assembly is in session, if satisfied  that  circumstances  exist which  render  it W.P No.11993 of 2014 5 necessary  to  take  immediate  action,  make  and promulgate  an  Ordinance  as  the  circumstances may require. (2)   An Ordinance promulgated under  this Article shall  have  the  same  force  and  effect  as  an Act  of [Majlis-e-Shoora  (Parliament)]  and  shall  be subject to like restrictions as the power of [Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament)] to make law, but every such Ordinance-- (a)  shall be laid – (i)  before  the  National  Assembly  if  it [contains provisions dealing with all or any of  the  matters  specified  in  clause  (2)  of Article  73],  and  shall  stand  repealed  at  the expiration of [one hundred and twenty days] from  its promulgation or,  if before  the  expiration of  that  period  a  resolution  disapproving  it  is passed  by  the  Assembly,  upon  the  passing  that resolution [Provided  that  the National Assembly may by a resolution extend  the Ordinance  for a further  period  of  one  hundred  and  twenty days  and  it  shall  stand  repealed  at  the expiration  of  the  extended  period,  or  if before  the  expiration  of  that  period  a resolution disapproving  it  is passed by  the Assembly,  upon  the  passing  of  that resolution:   Provided  further  that  extension  for further period may be made only once.] (ii)  before both Houses if it [does not contain provisions dealing with any of  the matters referred to in sub-paragraph (i)], and shall stand  repealed  at  the  expiration  of  [one hundred  and  twenty  days]  from  its promulgation  or,  if  before  the  expiration  of  that period  a  resolution  disapproving  it  is  passed  by either House, upon the passing of that resolution:    [Provided that either House may by a resolution  extend  it  for a  further period of one hundred  and  twenty  days  and  it  shall stand  repealed  at  the  expiration  of  the extended period, or  if before the expiration of  that period a  resolution disapproving  it is  passed  by  a House, upon  the  passing of that resolution: Provided further that extension for a further  period  may  be  made  only  once; and] (b) may  be withdrawn at  any  time  by  the President.”

8.  As to the true nature of Ordinance, suffice it to refer to Sabir Shah v. Shad Muhammad Khan (PLD  1995  SC  66)  followed  in  Federation  of W.P No.11993 of 2014 6 Pakistan  v. Muhammad Nawaz  Khokhar  (PLD 2000  SC  26,  36).    “From  an  examination  of Article 89’, so observed Saiduzzaman Siddiqui, J. “it  is  quite  clear  that  the  legislative  power conferred  by  this  Article  on  the  President  to promulgate  Ordinance  is  circumscribed  by  these conditions.    Firstly,  at  the  time  the  Ordinance  is promulgated  by  the  President,  the  National Assembly  must  not  be  in  session  and circumstances  exist  which  render  it  necessary  to take  immediate  action  for  promulgation  of  the Ordinance.   The Ordinance so promulgated by the President  is  only  a  stopgap  arrangement  and  a temporary measure,  as  this  Ordinance  has  to  be placed before  the National Assembly  if  it pertains to  matters  specified  in  Article  73(2)  of  the Constitution  and  in  all  other  cases  before  the Parliament,  within  4  months  of  the  date  of  its promulgation unless it is earlier withdrawn by the President  or  disapproved  by  the  National Assembly or Parliament as the case may be.   It  is, therefore,  quire  clear  that  the  power  to promulgate an Ordinance by  the President under Article 89 of the Constitution of 1973 is designed to meet  a  situation when  the  legislation  is  required urgently and  the Assembly  is either not  in session or is unable to function for reasons of having been dissolved  in accordance with  the provisions of  the Constitution  of  1973.    But  the  Ordinance  so promulgated by the President does not acquire the status of a permanent Act of Parliament as it loses its  validly  on  expiry  of  4 months period  from  the date of  its promulgation  if  the National Assembly or  Parliament  as  the  case  may  be,  does  not approve  the  legislative  measure  within  that period.”   Reference may also be made  to Federation of Pakistan  through  Secretary Ministry  of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Islamabad v. Dr. Mobashir Hassan and others (PLD 2012 SC 106) and the following observations at page 128:  “24.  In  terms  of  Article  89  of  the  Constitution, the President may promulgate an Ordinance and it shall  have  the  same  effect  as  an  Act  of  the Parliament.    However,  the  Article  inter  alia  provides  that  it  shall  stand  repealed  if  not extended  by  the  National  Assembly  within  the period stipulated in the said Article.”   In  Govt.  of  Punjab  through  Secretary, Home  Department  v.  Zia  Ullah  Khan  and  2 W.P No.11993 of 2014 7 others  (1992  SCMR  602),    the  Hon’ble Supreme  Court  had,  once  again,  the  occasion  to deal with the issue and observed as under: “We may state that, if we were to accept Mr. Irfan Qadir’s  above  contention,  the  same  would  be violative  of  Article  89  of  the  Constitution,  which envisages that, if an Ordinance of the type in issue is  not  approved  by  both  the  Houses  before  the expiry  of  four months  from  its  promulgation,  the same  shall  stand  repeal.    The  above  clear Constitutional  mandate  cannot  be  defeated  by pressing  into  service  any  rule  of  construction  of statutes  or  a  provision  of  a  statute which  cannot pressed  in  aid  while  construing  a  Constitutional provision.    We  may  further  observe  that  our Constitution  is  a  written  Constitution  based  on Federal System.  It envisages trichotomy of powers between  the  three  limbs  of  the  State  i.e.  that Legislature,  the  Executive  and  the  Judiciary.    In the above political  set up  the power  to  legislate  is vested  in  the parliament.   However, Article 89 of the  Constitution  empowers  the  President  to promulgate  an  Ordinance  when  the  National Assembly is not in Session or stands dissolved and he  (President)  upon  being  satisfied  that  the circumstances  exist which  render  it  necessary  to take  immediate  action.    Such  an  Ordinance  is  to last, at the most,  for  four months,  if not approved or  if  not  rejected  by  the  parliament  earlier  or withdrawn by the President in terms of sub-clause (a)  of  clause  (2)  of  the  above  Article  89  of  the Constitution.   The  rational  behind  providing  an  outer limit of four months for an Ordinance seems to be that even if the National Assembly or a Provincial Assembly  stands  dissolved  at  the  time  of promulgation of an Ordinance, the election of  it is to  take  place within  90  days  from  the  date  of  its dissolution  in  terms of  clause 5 of Article of 48 of the  Constitution.    Since  Ordinance  XIX  of  1988 was not placed for approval before the parliament within the above time limit of four months in terms of  sub-clause  (a) of  clause  (2) of  the Article 89,  it stands  repealed  with  the  amendments  contained therein  upon  the  expiry  of  four months  from  the date of its promulgation.”

9.  In these cases, the statement made and the document  relied upon by  the D.A.G brings home the fact that the Ordinance stands repealed at the expiration of one hundred  and  twenty days  from its  promulgation.    It  has  not  been  extended  by either  the Senate or  the National Assembly  for  a W.P No.11993 of 2014 8 further period by a resolution and  thus  it  follows indubitably that  it  loses  its validity, on the expiry of that period since it has not been made an Act of the Parliament within that period.  At best, it shall be  deemed  to  be  a  Bill  introduced  in  the House where it was first laid.

10.  In view of the above, no proceedings can be commenced or continued in the Gas Utility Courts set  up  by  the  Ordinance  2014  as  the  law  which was  the  provenance  of  their  powers  does  not occupy the field any more.   Thus any proceedings initiated, commenced  or  continued  will  be without lawful Authority and ultra-vires.

11.  It  is,  therefore,  held  that  since  the Ordinance, 2014  stands  repealed,  the Gas Utility Courts set up under that Ordinance shall cease to have effect and would become functus officio.

CONSEQUENCES

12.  There are certain unsavory and unpalatable consequences  that  flow  from  the  repeal  of  the Ordinance.   Since  the Ordinance  loses  its validity and  has  ceased  to  have  effect,  the  Gas  Utility Courts  set  up  by  that  Ordinance  shall  cease  to function  having  been  denuded  of  that  special power  under  the  Ordinance.    All  cases  pending  with  these  courts,  heretofore,  shall  stand transferred  to  the  ordinary  courts  of  plenary W.P No.11993 of 2014

 13. Jurisdiction to  be  adjudicated  upon  their  respective merits.  The proceedings in these cases can be continued from the stage at which they had reached before the Gas Utility Courts.  All of these cases  shall  be  tried  and  continued  under  the relevant law relating to such matters.  I described it  as  unsavory  and  unpalatable  consequences  for  the  litigants  as  the  vortex  of  litigation  does  not bring the end closer but only eclipses it.   In order to alleviate the litigants’ suffering, this order shall be communicated  to all  the District and Sessions  Judges who shall put steps into motion to transfer the  cases  pending  before  formerly Utility  Courts within  their  respective  jurisdiction  to  ordinary courts (according to each case) and shall complete the process within fifteen days from the receipt of this judgment.

With  the  above  observations,  all  these petitions are disposed of.

           (SHAHID KARIM)

               JUDGE

Announced in open Court on 15.12.2014.